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APPEARANCE OF BIAS AS GROUNDS FOR VACATING AN
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD-IMPLICATIONS OF
COMMONWEALTH COATINGS CORP. V. CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY CO. FOR LABOR ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. involved
the arbitration of a dispute between two contractors. The reasoning of
the opinion of the court contains possible implications for the review
of labor arbitration awards challenged on the ground of alleged
partiality of the arbitrator. The federal district courts find jurisdiction
to vacate labor arbitration awards under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA),' but nowhere in the LMRA is
there an express test of partiality the courts can apply. Section 10 of
the United States Arbitration Act provides a statutory test of
"evident partiality,"'-but it has been held that the United States
Arbitration Act does not apply to collective bargaining contracts in
interstate commerce.' A key issue, therefore, is whether the Section 10
test of "'evident partiality" developed in the opinion of
Comnmionwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. should
be applied to a question of partiality in a labor arbitration proceeding
where there is no statutory test.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Commonwealth Coatings Corporation, a subcontractor,
sued the sureties on the prime contractor's bond to recover money
alleged to be due on a painting contract. Pursuant to an arbitration
clause in the painting contract, Commonwealth Coatings Corporation
appointed one arbitrator and the prime contractor appointed a
second. The two arbitrators appointed a neutral third arbitrator. The
tripartite arbitration board unanimously rendered an award. Plaintiff,
the losing party, challenged the award under Section 10 of the United
1. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
2. Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1964), states certain
conditions upon which awards can be vacated. The arbitration award may be vacated (a) where
the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means, (b) where there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or either of them, (c) where the arbitrators were guilty
of certain misconduct and (d) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
3. See Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950); International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168
F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Metal Polishers, etc., International Union v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363
(E.D. Pa. 1949).
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States Arbitration Act The sole ground for his challenge was the
failure of the neutral arbitrator and the successful party to disclose a
past business relationship between them Plaintiff conceded that the
arbitrator was innocent of actual partiality, bias, or improper motive.
The Federal District Court for the district of Puerto Rico refused to
set aside the award. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed on the
ground that there was no "disturbingly close" relationship between
the "impartial" arbitrator and the successful party! The court held:
where there is a disturbingly close relationship the very failure to make
disclosure could be evidence of partiality. . . . However, we cannot say that the
relationship was sufficiently close to establish "evident partiality" within
the statute as a matter of law!
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 8 and
reversed the court of appeals. The Court split three ways. Mr.
Justice Black, writing for himself and three others, delivered the
opinion of the Court. Mr. Justices White and Marshall joined in a
concurring opinion. Mr. Justices Fortas, Harlan and Stewart
dissented.
Mr. Justice Black's opinion reasoned as follows: Section 10
provides not merely for arbitration but for impartial arbitration. The
requirements of impartiality taken for granted in every judicial
proceeding are not suspended when the parties agree to arbitrate. If
one party in a judicial proceeding can show that unknown to him, a
judge has had a prior business relationship with the opposing party,
there is no doubt that the judgment can be successfully challenged.
The fact that the prior business relationship constituted a small part
of the judge's income would not be material. A judge's decision
should be set aside by the court where there is "the slightest pecuniary
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1964).
5. The neutral arbitrator conducted a large engineering consultant business in Puerto
Rico. One of his regular customers in this business was the prime contractor that petitioner sued
in this case. The relationship was sporadic and there had been no dealings between them for
about a year immediately preceeding the arbitration. The relationship was nevertheless repeated
and involved fees of about $12,000 over a period of four or five years.
6. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 382 F.2d 1010 (Ist Cir.
1967). See also, Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp. v. American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. N.Y.), affd, 245 F.2d 873 (2d'Cir. 1957); Milliken Woolens Inc.
v. Weber Knit Sportswear, II App. Div. 2d 166, 202 N.Y.S.2d 431 (S. Ct. 1960), afj'd, 9
N.Y.2d 878, 216 N.Y.S.2d 696, 175 N.E.2d 826 (1961).
7. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 382 F.2d 1010, 1011-12
(Ist Cir. 1967).
8. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 390 U.S. 979 (1968).
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interest" on the part of the judge. Mr. Justice Black argued that
Congress intended to guarantee the constitutional principle of judicial
impartiality in arbitration proceedings, as illustrated by the broad
statutory language providing that an award can be set aside on the
basis of "evident partiality" or the use of "undue means." Therefore,
evidence of prior undisclosed business dealings constitutes "evident
partiality" within the meaning of Section 10 of the United States
Arbitration Act.
Mr. Justice White with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joined
concurring, stated that it is because arbitrators are men of affairs and
"of the marketplace" that they are effective in their adjudicatory
function. Therefore, arbitrators should not be held to a standard of
judicial decorum. Arbitrators should not be disqualified automatically
by undisclosed relationships that are trivial. Nevertheless, the
relationship in this case was substantial enough to warrant vacating
the award.
Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the dissent, argued that "'evident
partiality" means conduct by the arbitrator favoring one party rather
than another. Though the
failure of an arbitrator to volunteer information about business dealings with
one party will, prima facie, support a claim of partiality or bias. . . . But
where there is no suggestion that nondisclosure was calculated, and where the
complaining party disclaims any imputation of partiality, bias, or misconduct,
the presumption clearly is overcome."
Mr. Justice Black's "opinion of the court" held that to avoid the
Section 10 prohibition of "evident partiality," arbitration under the
United States Arbitration Act must be conducted in such a way as to
avoid even the appearance of partiality. Therefore, commercial
arbitrators have a duty to disclose to the parties any dealings that
might create an impression of possible bias, including the slightest
pecuniary interest in the case. It is suggested that the Section 10 test
9. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In this case, a magistrate's compensation was
determined by the number of guilty verdicts rendered by him in cases that came before his court.
The Supreme Court held that this procedure violated due process. In dictum, the Court said that
"even the slightest pecuniary interest" on the part of the judge would be grounds for setting
aside a decision, but this was not the holding of the case.
10. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., - U.S. __, 89 S.
Ct. 337 at 342 (1968) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). For cases holding that the
partiality of an arbitrator must be demonstrable see Giddens v. Board of Education, 398 Ill.
157, 75 N.E.2d (1947); E. Richard Meining Co. v. Katakura & Co., 241 App. Div. 406, 272
N.Y.S. 735 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 240 N.Y.S. 436 (Sup. Ct.
1930); Piccomini v. Pierucci, 54 Cal. App. 606, 202 P. 344 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
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of "evident partiality" developed by the Black opinion should not be
applied to the question of partiality in a labor arbitration proceeding.
DEVELOPMENT OF A SUITABLE TEST
Appearance of Partiality
The first determination in the development of a suitable test. of
partiality is whether to premise it on an appearance of partiality or
partiality in fact. The majority in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co. chose the former, the dissenters chose the
latter. The dissenters argued that arbitration is essentially consensual
and practical. It is "a system characterized by dealing-on-faith and
reputation for reliability."'" Therefore, only "conduct-or at least an
attitude or disposition-by the arbitrator favoring one party rather
than the other'1 2 will constitute sufficient partiality to vacate an
arbitrator's award.
The dissent is correct when it characterizes the arbitration
process as consensual and practical, but these characteristics do not, a
fortiori, demand a conclusion that the arbitration process must rely
on "dealing-on-faith" or the "reputation" of the arbitrator for its
efficacy. To the contrary, because the process is consensual, its
efficacy depends upon its acceptance, by the parties involved, as an
alternative to litigation or a strike. Its acceptance as an alternative,
furthermore, depends upon faith that the system produces just results.
It follows, therefore, that the efficacy of the arbitration process
depends upon the continued confidence that arbitration will produce a
just and impartial result. The appearance of partiality, therefore, in an
arbitration proceeding, will undermine the foundation of the system
by undermining confidence in the system.
De minimis non curat lex
Having ascertained that courts must look to the appearance of
partiality, one must establish the standard of appearance of partiality
to be applied in a labor arbitration proceeding. In particular, may
some conduct that would disqualify a judge be considered de minimis
when engaged in by a labor arbitrator? The answer must be
affirmative. The difference in the nature of the judicial system and the
labor arbitration process demands that the application of the test of
II. Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., - U.S. -, 89 S.
Ct. 337 at 342 (1968) (dissenting Opinion).
12. Id.
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appearance of partiality be different. "The labor arbitrator performs
functions which are not normal to the courts; the considerations
which help him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the
competence of the courts.' 1 3 The Supreme Court has stated that labor
arbitration calls into being a new common law of the industry or
shop" and "proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic.
He is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by a superior
authority which the parties are obliged to accept. . . . He is rather
part of a system of self-government created by and confined to the
parties. . .. "'
The distinctions between the roles of judges and arbitrators are
basic, for the question of appearance of partiality is really a question
of the expectations of the parties. If the parties expect the labor
arbitrator to bring to the arbitration proceeding the expertise
necessary to make determinations foreign to a court, then prior
dealings and contacts with one or more of the parties 6 may well be
within their set of expectations. Indeed the labor arbitrator sometimes
is chosen because of the knowledge gained through his prior dealings
and contacts in the industry and not disqualified due to them. The
system of self-government under which the labor arbitrator functions
recognizes that the labor arbitrator will not remain aloof but will have
been involved and continue to be involved with the events which
forge the common law of the industry.
Any test of an appearance of partiality in labor arbitration, being
a test of the expectations of the parties, must be framed from the
perspective of one who has an understanding of the common law of
the industry, and of the mores and practices of labor arbitration. The
Code of Ethics for Labor Management Arbitration outlines the
qualifications for office in Section 3."
It is, however, incumbent upon the arbitrator at the time of his selection to
disclose to the parties any circumstances, associations or relationships that
might reasonably raise any doubt as to his impartiality or his technical
qualification for the particular case. 8
13. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 at
581 (1960).
14. Id. at 582.
15. Id. at 581, quoting Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955).
16. Many of these prior contacts may have been in the form of service while on the
payroll of a party, while other contacts may have come about through service as a neutral.
17. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
Code ol Ethics and Procedural Standards jor Labor-Management Arbitration in M. TROTTA,
LABOR ARBITRATION 381 (1961).
18. Id. at 382.
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Necessarily implicit in the language "reasonably raise any doubt as to
his impartiality" is the qualification, "by one who understands the
mores and practices of the labor arbitration profession." This is not
the same as the standard of judicial decorum used by the majority in
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. Unlike
the standard of judicial decorum, the standard of an arbitrator's
decorum should consider the exigencies of the arbitration process.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The opinion of the Court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co. held the commercial arbitrator to a
standard of judicial decorum. It held that the test of "evident
partiality" includes a requirement to disclose to the parties any
dealing that might create an impression of possible bias, including the
slightest pecuniary interest in the case. To say this and nothing more
puts the arbitrator in a difficult position in determining what he must
disclose.
What test of partiality will be used as grounds for vacating a
labor arbitrator's award is still an open question. When the federal
courts do address themselves to the issue of the standard of partiality
to be applied in labor arbitration proceedings, the doctrine of
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. may,
unfortunately, be viewed as an acceptable test for labor arbitration.
Such a result would be a serious mistake. Rather than commit this
mistake, the courts must recognize the dynamics of the labor
arbitration process. Few would disagree that the labor arbitrator must
disclose to the parties any circumstances, associations, or
relationships that might reasonably create an appearance of partiality.
The critical qualification not recognized by the Commonwealth
Coatings rule is that the appearance of partiality in labor arbitration
must always be decided from the perspective of one who understands
the mores and practices of the labor arbitration profession. This
means that the strict standard of judicial decorum will be unworkable.
The exigencies of the labor arbitration process demand this
conclusion.
Roger C. Hartley
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